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Allen: The Constitutional Floor Doctrine and the Right to a Speedy Trial

NOTE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FLOOR DOCTRINE AND THE RIGHT
TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
I.

INTRODUCTION

Two warring themes consistently permeate our system of criminal
justice: procedural protection of the accused and the search for the
truth. To address the first, American courts created a due process
model to ensure that criminal defendants are afforded fundamentally
fair trials.1 This formula recognizes that greater stakes in criminal proceedings, including the loss of liberty and extreme social stigma,
require the scales of justice be heavily tipped in favor of the accused.
Counterbalancing the interest of the criminal defendant is the polar
star in the sky of our judicial system: truth. Any effective criminal justice process must be designed in such a way as to convict the guilty
and acquit the innocent. In short, the truth should generally prevail.
While these competing themes are clearly often in conflict with one
another,2 they do converge to support at least one conclusion: criminal
defendants should have a meaningful right to a speedy trial. The
speedy trial right aids the due process framework by preventing undue
oppression of presumptively innocent defendants; at the same time, it
also ensures more accuracy in juries' findings by indirectly mandating
fresher evidence.
Unfortunately, the speedy trial right is now under attack in many
jurisdictions because pragmatic judges are loath to address the pending crisis of crowded dockets. When faced with a dilemma of confronting a serious constitutional problem undercutting defendants'
1. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also Herbert L. Packer,
Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964).
2. See Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Public Perception,Justice, and the
"Search for Truth" in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1267, 1296-302 (1996)
(arguing that criminal lawyers, acting as zealous advocates, have ignored the search for
truth as a hallmark of the profession); see also John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are
Where You Find Them, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 339, 340-43 (1987) (arguing that the
American legal system is primarily concerned with legal guilt before truth).
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rights and the courts' search for the truth or, in the alternative, eroding
the speedy trial right for the sake of temporary expediency, many modern courts have consistently chosen the latter.
On May 2, 2003, the North Carolina Supreme Court elected to
contribute to those judicial waves slowly eroding the fundamental
right to a speedy trial. In State v. Spivey, 3 the Court purported to apply
the federally-mandated Barker v. Wingo4 speedy trial balancing test in
an opinion holding that a 1,659-day pre-trial delay did not violate the
right, guaranteed by both the United States and North Carolina Constitutions.5 As will be shown in this article, however, the Court did not
apply the flexible Barker test, but rather applied a more rigid framework with precedential roots in pre-Barker North Carolina decisions.
In light of the controlling authorities, the test articulated in Spivey is
either an unconstitutional departure from superior precedent or an
unconstitutional assertion of a lesser speedy trial right from Article 1,
§ 18 of the North Carolina Constitution.
This article will begin with a quick description of the historical
origins of the speedy trial right and the events marking its quiet evolution into a hallmark of our criminal justice system. It will then move
into a discussion of the decisions articulating principles of new federalism which require that state courts defer to the federal interpretations of fundamental rights, before discussing of the controlling
Supreme Court cases fashioning the test by which violations of the
right are measured. Next, this article will showcase the critical differences between Spivey and Barker to demonstrate why North Carolina's
speedy trial test intrudes upon those principles of federalism. The
article will then discuss why Spivey's excessive restrictions on the right
to a speedy trial undermine both central purposes of our criminal justice system: the protection of the accused and the search for the truth.
Finally, this article will conclude with two suggestions for remedying
this severe constitutional crisis: revival of the Speedy Trial Act or a
judicial expansion of the speedy trial right based on the North Carolina Constitution.

3. 357 N.C. 114, 579 S.E.2d 251 (2003).
4. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial..."); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18 ("right and justice
shall be administered without favor, denial, or delay").
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II.

THE RIGHT FROM RUNNYMEDE

The venerable right to a speedy trial, owing its origins to the
Magna Carta, is as old as our English legal heritage. 6 In the midst of a
civil war, English barons cornered King John on the meadows of Runnymede in 1215 and forced the desperate monarch to relinquish some
powers of his throne.7 Affixing his seal to this "Great Charter," King
John ceded that some rights are protected against the authority of the
sovereign. 8 By the terms of this historic parchment, even the king was
subject to a rule of law. 9 Of the many limitations on the power of the
sovereign, the Magna Carta required that he respect the right of all
"freemen" to a speedy disposition of trials.1" Over the course of the
following centuries, this right took on increasing importance as the
steady march of progress expanded that pool of "free" men.11
The speedy trial right eventually migrated to America with the
first ships of English settlers and, without much controversy, snuck
among those guarantees forming the hallmarks of our criminal justice
system. 1 2 Before the Revolutionary War, American colonists heralded
the Magna Carta and its provisions as natural law, inalienable by any
act of the king or Parliament.13 Even after disagreement over this principle compelled the American colonies to divorce themselves from the
British Empire, the speedy trial right attached itself to the emerging
American legal system. George Mason borrowed the speedy trial guarantee from the Magna Carta while authoring the Virginia Declaration
of Rights in the early stages of the American Revolution. 1 4 Almost
fourteen years later, James Madison proposed the speedy trial right
among a "Bill of Rights," a list of amendments designed to quell concerns about the expansive power of the new post-Articles govern6. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
7. Ralph V. Turner, The Meaning of the Magna CartaSince 1215, 53 HISTORY TODAY
29, 29-36 (2003).
8. James Podgers, Return to Runnymede, 85 A.B.A. JOURNAL 93, 93 (1999).
9. Id.
10. Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 223 (quoting the Magna Carta, "We will sell to no man, we
will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right") (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 225-26.
12. Id.
13. See Turner supra note 7, at 34-36.
14. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 8 (1776) ("That in all capital or criminal
prosecutions a man hath a right . . . to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of his
vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty, nor can he be
compelled to give evidence against himself; that no man be deprived of his liberty
except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers."); Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 225.
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ment. 1 5 When Madison's proposals passed Congress and survived
ratification, the right to a speedy trial was memorialized as constitu16
tional doctrine in the Sixth Amendment.
While the speedy trial prescription applied originally only to the
federal government, 1 7 the Supreme Court in 1967 held that the speedy
trial right, "one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution," is encompassed in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause and therefore also is binding on the states.1 8
In the proceeding years after the American Revolution, the Speedy
Trial Clause generated few waves in constitutional litigation.' 9 In the
rare speedy trial claim crashing the shores of the High Court, Justices
had refused to fashion a test for determining whether the right had
been violated.2 ° With no formal test and very little guidance, widely
disparate standards were applied depending simply upon the judge of
record or the state seal emblazoned on the wall behind him. This state
of constitutional disarray compelled Justice Brennan to note in 1970 a
pressing need to finally "trace [the] . . . contours" of the right.21
III.

A

HIGHER AUTHORITY

In 1972, a unanimous United States Supreme Court finally
resolved to refine the boundaries of the speedy trial right in Barker v.
Wingo. 22 Declining to intrude into the legislature's rule-making function by setting inflexible deadlines,2 3 the Court instead fashioned a
flexible, four-part balancing test for determinations of whether the
right has been violated. 24 The four factors to be considered include
the length of the delay, the government's reason for the delay, the
defendant's responsibility to assert the right, and resulting prejudice to
15. Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 225.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

17. See generally Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (holding, in the preFourteenth Amendment era, that the Bill of Rights proscribe only federal state action
infringing upon the rights granted in those amendments).
18. Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 222.
19. Barker, 407 U.S. at 515; see, e.g., United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971);
Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969); Klopfer,
386 U.S. 213; United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966); Pollard v. United States, 352
U.S. 354 (1957); Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 177 (1905).
20. Barker, 407 U.S. at 515.
21. Dickey, 398 U.S. at 40-41 (Brennan, J., concurring).
22. Barker, 407 U.S. at 514.
23. Id. at 529-30.
24. Id. at 530-33.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol26/iss2/2
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the defendant.2 5 According to the Court, these four considerations
lack any "talismanic qualities" and are therefore neither "necessary
[nor] sufficient condition[s] to the finding of a deprivation of the
right.

26

In Barker, the Supreme Court exercised its role as final arbiter of
those rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and its
Amendments. While the Bill of Rights originally vested in the people
protection from only the federal government, 2 7 the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment provided, the Supreme Court surmised, provided sufficient justification to grant the people the same safeguards
against the states. 21 Ultimately, the Court found that the "fundamental rights" in the first eight amendments are incorporated to the states
as Due Process guarantees. 2 9 The speedy trial right stands among
such "fundamental rights."3
The question then remains to what extent may state courts deviate
from the test articulated in Barker. While a sizeable contingent of the
Supreme Court at one time believed that the states were amenable only
to those "fundamental" parts of fundamental rights, 3 1 the Court ultimately decided the best approach was identical application at both
state and federal levels.3 2 According to Justice Goldberg, anything less
would allow "watered-down, subjective version[s] of the individual
guarantees of the Bill of Rights" and would grant states "greater latitude than the Federal Government to abridge concededly fundamental
33
liberties protected by the Constitution.
The framework adopted by the Supreme Court for assessing violations of fundamental constitutional rights has been clarified as a "con25. Id.
26. Id.at 533.
27. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 248-49 (1833).
28. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963).
29. Id.
30. Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 223.
31. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 39-40 (1978) (Burger, J. and Powell, J.,
dissenting); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 356, 375 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring);
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 375 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 172 (1968) (Fortas,J., concurring); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 408-9 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[Olur Constitution tolerates, indeed
encourages, differences between the methods used to effectuate legitimate federal and
state concerns.").
32. Crist, 437 U.S. at 36-37; Apodeca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972); see also
Pointer, 380 U.S. at 927-28 ("[The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause] is 'to be
enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same
standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment."').
33. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 413 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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stitutional floor" for states.3 4 As long as states buttress their decisions
on "adequate and independent state grounds, ' 35 they may provide
criminal defendants greater protection than the federal courts. They
may not, however, use those same independent grounds to deprive
their citizens of the minimum federal guarantee.3 6 The classic example
of this constitutional floor doctrine is Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins , 37 in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the California Supreme Court's interpretation of their state constitution as
converting malls into public forums, after the High Court had recognized in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner 38 that the Federal Constitution does not
require that malls be treated as public forums.
Applying this doctrine to speedy trial jurisprudence, the North
Carolina Supreme Court could hold that our state's speedy trial guarantee, Article I, § 18 of the North Carolina Constitution, provides
greater protection than Barker. The Court, however, could not avoid
Barker by holding that our state constitution confers a lesser right. In
sum, the North Carolina Supreme Court cannot construe its state constitution's speedy trial right as less protective than the United States
Supreme Court decisions articulating that right.
IV.

ALONG CAME A SPIVEY

The latest chapter in North Carolina speedy trial constitutional
doctrine began on October 17, 1994, when police officers were dispatched to a Lumberton, North Carolina housing project. After arriving on the scene, they found Jermaine Morris lying dead with eleven
bullets lodged in his torso. 3 9 The very next day, a nervous Henry Bernard Spivey, Jr. threw open the doors of the Lumberton Police Department and confessed his involvement in Morris' death.4 ° Spivey was
34. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: A Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Constitutional Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548-50

(1986).
35. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001).
36. See US. CONST. art. § 2; see also Barry Latzer, Towards the Decentralization of
Criminal Procedure:State ConstitutionalLaw and Selective Disincorporation,87 J. CRIM.
LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 63, 64 n.2 (1996). While states are free to interpret their
constitutional provisions as less protective of individual rights than the federal
government, the Supremacy Clause prohibits enforcement of less protective state laws
when the defendant is entitled to broader federal protection.
37. 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
38. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
39. State v. Spivey, 357 N.C. 114, 115, 579 S.E.2d 251, 253 (2003).
40. See id. Spivey informed the police that he and the victim, Jermaine Morris, had
been arguing over a female, Samantha Fields, when an angered Morris struck Spivey
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol26/iss2/2
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immediately led away to a prison cell. There he spent the next four and
a half years of his life still waiting for trial. If he had scratched a mark
in the wall for each day spent in that span, those scratches would have
numbered 1,659 when he entered a guilty plea on May 3, 1999.41
On November 27, 1995, after about thirteen months of pretrial
incarceration, Henry Spivey, Jr. submitted to the judge a handwritten
pro se "Motion Requesting a Prompt and Speedy Trial" which objected
to all further continuances to which his lawyer may acquiesce.4 2
Spivey's attorney objected and the judge refused to consider the
motion. Roughly twenty-three months later, on August 8, 1997,
Spivey's attorney filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial.4 3
and, after
Judge Jack Thompson set a special hearing for the matter
44
court.
open
in
motion
the
denied
arguments,
hearing
With the prospects of a trial looming, Spivey cut short his status
as a pretrial detainee by pleading guilty to a lesser offense, seconddegree murder.4 5 The predicate plea agreement reserved for Spivey the
right to appeal Judge Thompson's denial of his motion to dismiss.4 6
Henry Spivey, Jr. availed himself of this provision, but to little effect in
the North Carolina appellate courts. 4 7 The Court of Appeals, over the
dissent of Judge Timmons-Goodson, affirmed the lower court's
decision.48
When the case reached the North Carolina Supreme Court, the
Court, by a margin of five to two, affirmed the denial of Spivey's
motion.4 9 Writing for the majority, Justice Wainwright first noted the
controlling authorities: the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
and Article I, § 18 of the North Carolina Constitution. 0 Both, he
added, are to be interpreted through the lens of the Barker v. Wingo
balancing test.5 1 The length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the

defendant's assertion of the right, and the prejudice to the defendant
"are related factors and must be considered together with any such
with his fist. The defendant and his cousin responded by pulling out their guns and
firing at Morris.
41. Id. at 119, 579 S.E.2d at 257 (Brady, J., dissenting).
42. Id at 115, 579 S.E.2d at 253.
43. Id.

44. Id. at 116, 579 S.E.2d at 253.
45. Id.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
See generally State v. Spivey, 150 N.C. App. 189, 563 S.E.2d 12 (2002).
Spivey, 357 N.C. at 114, 579 S.E.2d at 251.
Id. at 118, 579 S.E.2d at 254-55.
Id.
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circumstances as may be relevant. '5 2 The court continued, "[i]n sum,
these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a
difficult and sensitive balancing process." 3
Despite quoting Barker's proscription against talismans, the
Spivey majority proceeded to apply a test replete with such magical
hurdles. While Barker mandated a "sensitive balancing process,"5 4 the
Spivey Court adopted an analytical framework that is best described as
an obstacle course: only after jumping over hurdles and meeting some
high threshold of performance at each stage can a criminal defendant
finally claim his or her constitutional right. This judicially created
obstacle course is replete with magical talismans designed before
Barker leveled the playing field; their use should not have persisted
past that point.
1.

Stage One: Length of Delay

The first hurdle in the judicially created obstacle course is based
on the first Barker factor, the length of the delay.5 5 The Barker Court
56
noted that the first factor serves as an initial "triggering mechanism. 1
Only until the length of the defendant's pretrial incarceration exceeds
some "presumptively prejudicial" length of time may the court proceed
to inquiry of the other three factors.5 7 Nowhere, however, does the
Barker Court indicate that this triggering function divorces the "length
of time" factor from rest of the balancing equation. Nowhere does Justice Powell say that this "difficult and sensitive balancing process '"58
requires courts to treat a pretrial delay of ten years no differently than
a pretrial delay barely touching the lower reaches of "presumptive
prejudice."
Later U.S. Supreme Court decisions have clarified this aspect of
the balancing test by recognizing that judicial consideration of this factor, in fact, requires a double inquiry. 5 9 After asking whether the delay
is sufficient to trigger further inquiry, reviewing courts must then consider "the extent to which the delay stretches beyond that bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim."6 ° The
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533).
Id.
Id.
Spivey, 357 N.C. at 118, 579 S.E.2d at 254 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530).
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 533.
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992).
Id. at 652.
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period of time separating the actual delay from the lower reaches of a
presumptively prejudicial delay is of great importance, the Court has
noted, because the passage of time alone can prejudice the defendant
in ways that cannot be adequately measured or remedied. 6
In Spivey, the N.C. Supreme Court engages in a very limited
inquiry on this first factor, restricting the analysis only to whether the
period of four and a half years amounted to a sufficiently "presumptively prejudicial" period of time. 62 This application defies not only
superior case authority, but also the plain language of the phrase it
invokes. "Presumptively prejudicial" is no term of art; it has a very
real and practical meaning, one recognized consistently before and
after Barker.6 3 As will be discussed in greater depth later in this article, a greater period of delay necessarily entails a greater likelihood of
prejudice. The presumption must therefore be given different weight
in each case depending on the length of the delay.6 4
2.

Stage Two: Reason for Delay

The next obstacle offered by the Spivey majority stems from
Barker's second factor, the reason for the delay.6 5 In Barker, Justice
Powell held that different weights should be assigned to different justifications proffered by the government. 6 6 Powell offered a sliding-scale
approach to this balancing. At one extreme, prosecutorial acts evincing a clear intent to prejudice the ability of the defendant to mount a
defense should tip the scales heavily in favor of the defendant, almost
irrespective of the other three factors. 67 At the other extreme, justifia61. See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 53 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("Although prejudice seems to be an essential element of speedy-trial violations, it
does not follow that prejudice-or its absence, if the burden of proof is on the
government-can be satisfactorily shown in most cases. . . . [Cloncrete evidence of
prejudice is often not at hand. Even if it is possible to show that witnesses and
documents, once present, are now unavailable, proving their materiality is more
difficult. And it borders on the impossible to measure the cost of delay in terms of the
dimmed memories of the parties and available witnesses."); see also United States v.
Mann, 291 F. Supp. 268, 271 (1968) (With long delays, "prejudice may fairly be
presumed simply because everyone knows that memories fade, evidence is lost, and
the burden of anxiety upon any criminal defendant increases with the passing months
and years.").
62. Spivey, 357 N.C. at 119, 579 S.E.2d at 255 (concluding four and one half years
is sufficient delay to trigger inquiry into the other factors).
63. See Dickey, 398 U.S. at 53 (Brennan, J., concurring); Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
64. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
65. Spivey, 357 N.C. at 118, 579 S.E.2d at 254 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530).
66. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
67. See id.
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ble reasons such as a missing witness can excuse some reasonable
delay and only lightly tip the balance in the defendant's favor, if at
all. 68 The Court also noted the existence of a middle range of "neutral
reasons" which courts must weigh against the state, albeit to a lesser
extent, because "the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances
must rest with the government rather than the defendant. '69 Justice
Powell offered two examples of such "neutral" justifications:
prosecutorial negligence and crowded dockets.7 °
Robeson County prosecutors defended the delay in bringing
Spivey's case to trial by arguing that their dockets were contemporaneously clogged with murder cases and that renovation of the courthouse limited the number of cases they could hear at one time.7 '
Applying the Barker test, crowded dockets and other circumstances for
which the government ultimately bears responsibility fall in the neutral range, weighing to the defendant's advantage in the sensitive balancing process.
In analyzing this second factor, however, the Spivey majority
presents an interesting hurdle clearly not contemplated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1972. The Spivey majority places in front of a criminal defendant an absolute bar to the weighting of this factor unless he
can show either "neglect or willfulness" on the part of prosecutors in
bringing his case to trial.7 2 This harsh "all-or-nothing" approach to the
"reason for delay" factor owns precedent in a long line of North Carolina Supreme Court cases.73 An older variation of this rule migrated to
this state in 1963,"M by a decision citing a U.S. Supreme Court opinion
from 1956. 75 Soon after Barker rocked the foundational pillars of the
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Spivey, 357 N.C. at 120, 579 S.E.2d at 255-56.
72. See id.at 119, 579 S.E.2d at 255 ("[Dlefendant has the burden of showing that
the delay was caused by the neglect or willfulness of the prosecution. Only after the
defendant has carried his burden of proof by offering prima facie evidence showing
that the delay was caused by the neglect or willfulness of the prosecution must the

State offer evidence fully explaining the reasons for the delay and sufficient to rebut
the prima facie evidence.").
73. See State v. Webster, 337 N.C. 674, 679, 447 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1994); State v.
Marlowe, 310 N.C. 507, 521, 313 S.E.2d 532, 541 (1984); State v. Tann, 302 N.C. 89,
94-95, 273 S.E.2d 720, 724 (1981); State v. Hill, 287 N.C. 207, 212, 214 S.E.2d 67, 71
(1975); State v. Gordon, 287 N.C. 118, 126, 213 S.E.2d 708, 713 (1975); State v.
Brown, 282 N.C. 117, 124, 191 S.E.2d 659, 664 (1972).
74. See State v. Patton, 260 N.C. 359, 364, 132 S.E.2d 891, 894 (1963).
75. See Pollard v United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361-62 (1975) ("The delay must not
be purposeful or oppressive.").
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speedy trial right in 1972, the North Carolina Supreme Court in State

v. Hill encountered the dilemma of contradictory precedent at the state
and federal levels.7 6 Surprisingly, the Hill Court specifically noted the
apparent contradiction between the Barker language and the North
Carolina rule, but nonetheless applied the local state rule.7 7 Such defiance of a constitutional floor established by the United States Supreme
Court is plainly incompatible with the modern conception of
federalism.
The all-or-nothing, "neglect or willfulness" framework applied in
North Carolina courts contradicts the Barker framework in three key
respects. First and foremost, it necessarily precludes any "sensitive"
balancing of the particular facts of each case.78 Once the reviewing
court determines whether the hurdle has been met, the Spivey framework does not require further analysis of the particular facts relevant
to that inquiry. Second, it places prosecutorial misconduct on the
same plane as prosecutorial negligence. The operative question then is
whether the prosecutors are culpable, not-the extent of their culpability. Unfortunately, this second difference has had little practical value
for criminal defendants, given the deference provided by our state's
courts to prosecutors' proffered excuses.7 9
A third and important distinction between the decisions is
Spivey's crowded dockets exemption. In Spivey, the Court applies the
North Carolina approach specifically exempting crowded dockets from
inquiry, allowing such an excuse to operate as a "royal flush;" a simple
demonstration that the prosecutors tried every case in order could
defeat any invocation of the speedy trial right.8 0 North Carolina, in
effect, places the entire onus of clogged dockets on the defendant in
76. See State v. Hill, 287 N.C. 209, 212, 214 S.E.2d 67, 71 (1975).
77. Id. ("[The Barker Court held that a] 'neutral reason such as negligence or
overcrowded courts should be weighed less heavily but nevertheless should be
considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the
government rather than with the defendant.' In this State, the burden of showing
neglect or willful delay is on the defendant.") (emphasis added).
78. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
79. Some judges in this state have acknowledged the possibility that crowded
dockets could be the result of prosecutorial negligence. See State v. Hammond, 141
N.C. App. 152, 176-77, 541 S.E.2d 166, 183 (2000) (Greene, J., dissenting) ("Although
there is no showing the prosecutor intentionally delayed the trial for the purpose of
obtaining an advantage over defendant, the record clearly shows [that] the prosecutor
did not make a reasonable effort to avoid the excessive delay of defendant's trial and

thus was negligent.").
80. Spivey, 357 N.C. at 117, S.E.2d at 254 ("Our courts have consistently
recognized congestion of criminal dockets as a valid justification for delay.") (quoting
State v. Hughes, 54 N.C. App. 117, 199, 282 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1981)).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2004

11

Campbell
Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 2
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:101

spite of the fact that prosecutors exercise great control and defendants
exercise little control over the speed at which trials are processed. It
also appears to have largely gone unnoticed by many North Carolina
jurists that crowded dockets are sometimes the result of prosecutors'
negligence.8 1 In such circumstances, even the Spivey test should mandate weighting of this factor in favor of the defendant.
3.

Stage Three: Assertion of the Right
The third stage of the obstacle course test applied by the Spivey
Court stems from the third Barker factor, the defendant's responsibility to claim his right.8 2 In analyzing this factor, the North Carolina

Supreme Court once again purports to apply the Barker balancing test
but instead invokes relics of antiquated, pre-Barker North Carolina
precedent explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in 1972. In Barker
v. Wingo, the Supreme Court considered and rejected a rule requiring
the defendant to specifically motion for a speedy trialY83 The
"demand-waiver" approach, applied by North Carolina courts before
Barker,8 4 construed defendants' silence as a waiver of the right to a
speedy trial.8 5 In denouncing this approach, Justice Powell argued its
impracticality; it inevitably left defense counsel in a quandary 6 She
could either invoke the right early and often, threatening her client's
interests by disenabling time for preparation, or quietly acquiesce to
the government's continuances, waiving her client's rights to a prompt
disposition.8 7
The better approach, Justice Powell opined, was a flexible rule in
which the defendant has some responsibility to raise the right, but
where silence and acquiescence are not treated equally. 8 The rule, as
stated by Powell, thus entailed more balancing, permitting "for example, a court to attach a different weight to a situation in which the
defendant knowingly fails to object from a situation in which his attorney acquiesces in long delay without adequately informing his client,
or from a situation in which no counsel is appointed."8 9 The majority
opinion and concurrence, however, made it clear that it would be inor81. See Hammond, 141 N.C. at 176-77, 541 S.E.2d at 183.
82. Spivey, 357 N.C. at 118, 579 S.E.2d at 254 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530).
83. Barker, 407 U.S. at 523.
84. See State v. Harrell, 281 N.C. 111, 187 S.E.2d 789 (1972); see also State v.
Hollers, 266 N.C. 45, 52, 145 S.E.2d 309, 314 (1965).
85. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 523-25.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 528.
88. Id. at 528-29.
89. Id.
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dinately difficult to show a violation of the speedy trial right unless the
defendant made such protestations. 90
In Spivey, the Court takes the demand-waiver approach rejected by
Barker and peppers it with an even stronger flavor. After Spivey, a
defendant must not only promptly motion for a speedy trial for this
factor to be weighted in the balancing scheme, but he also must do so
with the help and consent of his counsel.9 1 Henry Spivey's specific
requests for a speedy trial were afforded no weight whatsoever by the
North Carolina Supreme Court simply because the request was made
pro se over the objection of his attorney. 9 2 The motion, the North Carolina Supreme Court held, was not determinative as to whether he had
requested a speedy trial, because "a defendant does not have the right
to be represented by counsel and [to also] appear pro se."93
Besides creating an unsettling implication that lawyers- and not
individuals- own individual rights,9 4 this language in Spivey contradicts Justice Powell's illustrations of the flexible Barker approach. 95 In
Barker, Powell explains that a situation in which the defendant is not
involved in his lawyer's decisions to acquiesce to continuances should
not be weighted the same as a situation in which an informed defendant deliberately and knowingly acquiesces to the government's
90. See id. at 534 ("More important than the absence of serious prejudice, is the
fact that Barker did not want a speedy trial .... Instead the record strongly suggests
that while he hoped to take advantage of the delay in which he had acquiesced, and
thereby obtain a dismissal of the charges, he definitely did not want to be tried."); see
also id. at 536-37 (White, J., concurring) ("Although the Court rejects petitioner's
speedy trial claim and affirms denial of his petition for habeas corpus, it is apparent
that had Barker not so clearly acquiesced in the major delays involved in this case, the
result would have been otherwise.").
91. Cf. Spivey, 357 N.C. at 121, 579 S.E.2d at 256 (holding that the defendant's
request for a speedy trial was not weighted in the balancing test because the defense
counsel's objection to that request).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Note how Spivey is deprived of any meaningful choice in this matter. He has
only two options: (1) he can defer to the lawyer's judgment, thereby waiving any right
to a speedy trial; or (2) he can also fire his attorney for objecting to this request, but
doing so would engender even more delay, frustrating the very purpose of the request.
95. While Powell's illustrations might be considered dicta, not all scholars
subscribe to such a narrow definition of "holding." See Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent:
What It is and What It Isn't, When Do We Kiss It and When Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L.
REV. 605, 607 (1990) (arguing cases' holdings are limited only to their facts and
outcome); but see Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 199899 (1994) (arguing that the holding/dictum distinction should also attribute special
significance to courts' rationales).
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delays. 9 6 Powell referenced an example of a defendant who was not
adequately informed by his counsel of his right. 9 7 The facts of Spivey
appear to warrant an even greater tipping of the scales, since the criminal defendant took extraordinary measures to ensure the court understood his desire for a speedy trial.98
4.

Stage Four: Prejudice

Finally, if a criminal defendant successfully navigates these first
three obstacles, he still must clear the hurdle of the fourth Barker factor, prejudice to the defendant. 9 9 In the pre-Barker era, the United
States Supreme Court consistently recognized three principle interests
served by the speedy trial right: prevention of undue and oppressive
pretrial incarceration, minimization of the accused's anxiety arising
from public accusation, and reduction of the possibility that the delay
will prejudice the ability of the accused to defend himself.1 ° ° In
Barker, Justice Powell held that the fourth factor should be assessed in
light of these three interests.' 01 He opined that the last of the three
interests is the most important "because the inability of a defendant to
adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system."' 0 2
The Barker Court did not address whether an affirmative showing of
particularized prejudice is required.'0 3
The question of whether a showing of actual prejudice is necessary, therefore, was unresolved. In United States v. Loud Hawk,'0 4 a
closely divided Supreme Court hinted in dictum it was willing to entertain a harsher rule allowing a defendant to prevail on a speedy trial
claim only when he can affirmatively demonstrate that the delay was
96. Barker, 407 U.S. at 527-28.
97. Id.
98. Spivey, 357 N.C. at 115, 579 S.E.2d at 253.
99. Id. at 118, 579 S.E.2d at 254 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530).
100. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971); Smith v. Hooey, 393
U.S. 374, 377-78 (1969); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 221-22 (1967);
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
101. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
102. Id.
103. Decisions closely following Barker did not find such a requirement of actual,
particularized prejudice in the language of the opinion. See Moore v. Arizona, 414
U.S. 25, 27 (1973) ("Moreover, prejudice to a defendant caused by delay in bringing
him to trial is not confined to the possible prejudice to his defense in those
proceedings.").
104. 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986).
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outcome-determinative.10 5 In the principal decision, Doggett v. United
10 6
States, however, another slim majority rejected such an approach.
According to the Doggett Court, prejudice can be presumed when there
is excessive delay, even absent a showing of particularized
prejudice.' 0 7 Central to this holding was a recognition that prejudice
10 8
can take forms that are not easily quantifiable or measurable.
Requiring the defendant prove such slippery facts as the absence or
loss of memory of witnesses places an insurmountable burden before
even meritorious claims.
In Spivey, the North Carolina Supreme Court applied a rigid test
requiring that the defendant affirmatively prove "actual and substantial" prejudice in order to succeed on the asserted speedy trial right
violation.' 9 In essence, Spivey apparently requires defendants to
prove their delay was outcome-determinative; that is, they would have
been acquitted had their trials been held as soon as was practicable.
The Spivey Court therefore, unlike Barker and Doggett, considers only
one of the three forms of prejudice, the effect on the accused's trial,
and places on the defendant the inordinately high burden of proving
the delay actually hindered his ability to mount a defense. One of the
first times this "actual and substantial prejudice" requirement is mentioned by a North Carolina court in the context of the right to a speedy
trial was in State v. Brown," which despite post-dating Barker by
about six months did not mention the landmark decision.
Nevertheless, this "actual and substantial prejudice" language
appears to have reached the Spivey Court through faulty interpretations of federal constitutional law. Specifically, the error likely results
from a failure of some courts to recognize the difference between the
Barker Sixth Amendment speedy trial test and the Lovasco Due Process
test designed to capture those claims falling outside of the ambit of the
Sixth Amendment's protection. In Marion, the United States Supreme
Court held that Sixth Amendment protects defendants from excessive
delays only after the point at which a formal accusation is lodged."'
105. Id. at 315 (holding that a defendant's showing of "the possibility of prejudice
not sufficient to support [the defendant's position that] . . .speedy trial rights were
violated.") (emphasis added).
106. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 ("[Cjonsideration of prejudice is not limited to the
specifically demonstrable, and ... affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not
essential to every speedy trial claim.").
107. Id.

108. Id.
109. See Spivey, 357 N.C. at 122, 579 S.E.2d at 257.
110. See Brown, 282 N.C. at 123, 191 S.E.2d at 664.
111. See Marion, 404 U.S. at 324.
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The Due Process Clause, in addition to any relevant statutes
tion, protects defendants from excessive delay before that
accusation. While the more stringent two-pronged Lovasco
require "actual and substantial prejudice," ' 1 2 the flexible,
nged Sixth Amendment test does not.
5.

of limitapoint of
test does
four-pro-

Game Recap

In sum, Barker and its progeny fashioned a flexible ad-hoc balancing test that allows reviewing courts to consider all of the relevant
facts. The United States Supreme Court provided guidance in the form
of four factors. To accomplish the balancing of these factors, courts
must first consider whether the length of the delay permits further
inquiry into the other factors, as well as whether with the length of the
delay reaches past the lower bounds of presumptive prejudice." 3 The
court must then consider the government's proffered excuse for the
delay, weighing this factor into the balancing scheme depending upon
the degree of reasonableness.' 1 4 Crowded dockets, for example, are
included among neutral justifications which nonetheless must be
weighed in favor of the defendant.' 1 5 Under the Barker test, a reviewing court must next consider the extent to which the defendant
attempted to assert the right." 6 A persistent effort will weigh heavily
in the defendant's favor, but complacency with the government's continuances will make it inordinately difficult for the defendant to prevail
on a claim. 11 7 Finally, the Barker test requires consideration of
whether the defendant has suffered any prejudice as a result of the
delay. Defendants are not required to affirmatively prove the prejudice
was outcome determinative for this factor to be considered."" In fact,
the defendant's sufferance of anxiety, among other things, is afforded
at least some weight.
The "balancing test" applied in Spivey, on the other hand, is a
rigid, inflexible framework retaining only the outer shell of Barker in
112. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1971) (Proof of actual
prejudice is "generally a necessary but not sufficient condition to establish a due
process violation") (emphasis added); see also United States v. Sturdy, 207 F.3d 448,
452 (2000) ("To prove a violation of his due process rights, Sturdy must establish that:
(1) the delay resulted in actual and substantial prejudice to the presentation of the
defense ...")(emphasis added).
113. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-52.
114. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 528-29.
117. See id. at 534-35.
118. See Moore, 414 U.S. at 26.
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the form of its four factors. The Spivey test, unlike Barker, forbids consideration of each factor unless the criminal defendant can first meet
some high threshold of proof. The first factor, the length of the delay,
serves only as an initial triggering function and plays no part in the
rest of the balancing calculus.' 19 A delay of ten years is afforded no
more weight than a delay of just one year. For the Court to consider
the second factor, the reason for the delay, the Spivey test requires the
defendant to prove that the government willfully delayed his case in
order to gain a tactical advantage at trial. 12 ° While the test purports to
also punish prosecutorial negligence, this aspect of the test appears
unsupported by case law since prosecutorial negligence, when evidenced by crowded dockets, is specifically exempted from consideration.' 2 1 Finally, the defendant must also prove "actual and substantial
prejudice" in order for any prejudice suffered by him to be considered.' 2 2 In practice, Spivey requires the delay be shown to have been
outcome-determinative; the defendant must meet the insurmountable
burden of proving that, but for the delay, he would have been
acquitted.
In form and effect, therefore, North Carolina's test for determining
whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated presents a marked
departure from that articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Barker and Doggett. In the balancing process, the test weights the government's excuses more heavily and the prejudice suffered by the
defendants less heavily. It also permits excuses for aversion of the fact
that the defendant took extreme measures to assert the right. The
Spivey test is therefore more rigid and less protective of criminal
defendants' rights to a speedy trial than is constitutionally permitted.
V.

TANGLED IN SPIVEY'S WEB

Before proceeding to prescribe any remedies for the dire state of
speedy trial constitutional doctrine in this state, this article will first
establish the grave impact of Spivey's narrowing of the right. It is not
difficult to imagine why a speedy trials are necessary. In courtrooms
throughout the country, witnesses are called to testify about important
legal distinctions rooted in trivial factual distinctions. It is not uncom119. Spivey, 357 N.C. at 119, 579 S.E.2d at 255.
120. Id.
121. See Brown, 282 N.C. at 124, 191 S.E.2d at 664 (1972) ("The congestion of
criminal court dockets has consistently been recognized as a valid justification for
delay. Both crowded dockets and lack of judges or lawyers, and other factors, make
some delays inevitable.").
122. Spivey, 357 N.C. at 122, 579 S.E.2d at 257.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2004

17

118

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 2
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:101

mon for prosecutors to ask witnesses to recount minute, peripheral
details of an event long past in order to demonstrate some fuzzy legal
concept, such as whether the defendant entertained "malice aforethought" or whether the defendant subjectively and objectively feared
for his life. Even when the underlying events occurred years prior to
trial, courts are given little choice but to proceed upon an assumption
that these recounted memories are accurate portrayals of the underlying events.
As noted earlier in this article, the speedy trial guarantee was
designed to ensure that defendants would not be unfairly hindered in
their ability to mount a successful defense due simply to the passage of
time. 12 3 Of the three interests articulated by Brennan in Dickey, this
interest is by far the most important to our system of criminal justice
because it implicates both central, warring themes mentioned in the
introduction of this article: the judicial search for truth and the due
24
process model.1

In his Dickey v. Florida concurrence, Justice Brennan noted that
the passage of time alone significantly hinders the quest for that judicial Holy Grail, truth. 1 2 5 Witnesses may die or move away while the
1 26
defendant awaits trial, depriving the jury of their versions of events.
Physical evidence may also be lost during that interim period, depriving the court of their rightful probative benefit.'2 7 Justice Brennan also
expressed concern that witnesses' memories may fade while they wait
to play their role in the criminal proceedings. 128 This effect, he noted,
is inherent in delay, yet is so slippery that it can very rarely ever be
affirmatively proven.

1 29

Because of the prevalence of eyewitness testimony in American
courtrooms, the effect of faded memories has the potential to wreak
havoc on defendants' ability to receive fair trials. Unfortunately, jurors
place greater weight on eyewitness evidence than any other forms of
evidence. 130 In a study conducted by cognitive psychologist Elizabeth
123. Dickey, 398 U.S. at 53 (Brennan, J., concurring).
124. See, e.g., Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1965).
125. See Dickey, 398 U.S. at 42 (Brennan, J., concurring).

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Elizabeth F. Loftus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 9 (1979) ("Jurors have been known
to accept eyewitness testimony pointing to guilt even when it is far outweighed by
evidence of innocence"); see also U.S. Department of Justice, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A
GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999) ("Although the evidence eyewitnesses provide
can be tremendously helpful in developing leads, identifying criminals, and
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Loftus in 1979, jurors in her mock trials were 400% more likely to
convict the defendant when the prosecution presented eyewitness testi13
mony than when only circumstantial evidence was presented. '
Remarkably, Loftus' test revealed that jurors were still 3 7 8 % more
likely to convict the defendant when the prosecution used a discredited eyewitness. 1 32 In spite of the great reliance our system places on
eyewitness testimony, such evidence is historically prone to error.
Studies have consistently shown that around ninety percent of all capital felons later exonerated by DNA evidence were convicted at least in
part on the basis of eyewitness testimony. 13 3 One of the primary reasons such evidence has caused such grave errors is because of the corrosive effect of the passage of time on witnesses' memories.
While Brennan may lack expertise in the relevant disciplines, his
grave warnings that the judicial journey towards truth can be derailed
by long pretrial delays have born fruit in the field of cognitive psychology. According to experts in the field, the passage of time has two
primary negative effects on the ability of witnesses to testify accu13 4
rately: memory erosion and memory alteration.
In the interim period between crime and trial, it is inevitable that
the witness' memories will fade. As demonstrated by Ebbinghaus' Forgetting Curve in 1885 and confirmed many times since, the passage of
time alone significantly erodes the completeness of witnesses' testimony.' 3 5 As days, months, and years pass us by, we naturally shed
memories of our past experiences. While the rate of erosion diminexonerating the innocent, this evidence is not infallible. Even honest and wellmeaning witnesses can make errors, such as identifying the wrong person or failing to
identify the perpetrator of a crime.").
131. See Loftus, supra note 130, at 10-11.
132. Id.
133. C. Ronald Huff, Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy, The American Society
of Criminology 2001 Presidential Address, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1-19 (2002); see also
Daniel L. Shacter, THE SEVEN SINS OF MEMORY: HOW THE MIND FORGETS AND REMEMBERS

92 (2001).
134. See Schacter supra note 133, at 21.The prevailing view among psychologists
today is that there are three separate stages of memory performance: the acquisition,
retention, and retrieval stages. Memory can be corrupted at each stage, but the
influences of time are most almost exclusively effected during the retention stage.
135. A HISTORY OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY 105-13 (C. James Goodwin, ed., John Wiley
& Sons 1999). In 1885, German philosopher Hermann Ebbinghaus published the preeminent work on learning and memory, Memory: A Contribution to Experimental
Psychology. In this tome he introduced the "Forgetting Curve," a phenomenon in
which human memory decays at negatively exponential rates. Shortly after perception,
the human brain sheds memory of a past experience at a very fast pace. As time
passes, the rate at which the event is forgotten slows but persists.
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ishes with time, it never ceases to persist. 13 6 Therefore, the failure of
our courts to promptly dispose of criminal trials virtually ensures that
fact-finders do not receive the fullest picture of the underlying events.
Memory decay, of course, might be of little consequence in criminal trials if witnesses pleaded ignorance whenever their memories
failed them. Studies have shown, however, that witnesses are more
than willing to fill in the blanks created by memory decay. 137 What is
placed in these blanks is often a reflection of two of memory's primary
corruptive influences: bias and post-event information. The work of
British psychologist Frederick C. Bartlett in 1932 demonstrated that
humans store memories in organization systems that reflect our present biases and prejudices. 38 Other psychological studies have also
demonstrated that witnesses adapt their memories to make them consistent with subsequently acquired information.1 39 A longer period of
time between the crime and testimony inevitably permits these corruptive influences greater opportunity to alter witnesses' memories.
The speedy trial right is also consonant with the due process
model, standing among those procedural safeguards ensuring that
criminal defendants are not unduly punished while the presumption
of innocence still stands. 140 In Dickey, Justice Brennan noted two
other interests are served by the speedy trial right which seeks to prevent unfair punishment of criminal defendants: the prevention of
undue and oppressive pretrial incarceration and minimization of the
defendant's anxiety arising from public accusation.
VI.

A BITTER PILL AND A

GREAT

LEArP FORWARD

As constitutional doctrine, the speedy trial right currently stands
on shaky ground. The latest Supreme Court decision articulating a
flexible Barker interpretation was decided by only a single vote. 14 1 In
that pivotal decision, dissenters favored a watered-down approach not
altogether different from the one applied in Spivey.' 4 2 For that reason,
I propose two solutions to ensure criminal defendants are afforded the
full protection of Barker for the foreseeable future in this state. First,
the North Carolina General Assembly should revive its Speedy Trial
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Loftus, supra note 130, at 82-84.
Goodwin, supra note 135, at 401-02.
Loftus, supra note 130, at 54-55.
See generally Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (holding that the

speedy trial right is incorporated to the states as a procedural due process guarantee).
141. See generally Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
142. See id. at 659-71 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Act, setting hard deadlines for all phases of criminal trials. Second, the
North Carolina Supreme Court should take a great leap forward in
speedy trial constitutional doctrine; our Highest Court should not
only catch up our state to the constitutional floor of Barker and Doggett, but actually elevate our state-based speedy trial right above that
floor as well.
My first proposal is the passage of a Speedy Trial Act to ensure
that cases are promptly disposed of by our state judicial system. In
federal courts, the Barker balancing test was made nearly moot with
the passage of the Speedy Trial Act in 1974.143 With this bill, Congress legislatively filled the same void that the Barker Court believed
itself institutionally incompetent to address 144 by setting hard deadlines for certain phases of federal criminal trials. In 1977, the North
Carolina General Assembly passed a Speedy Trial Act modeled on the
one adopted by Congress.1 4 5 Not long thereafter, however, the General
Assembly repealed the act, citing commissioned studies showing that
prosecutorial districts were failing to comply with the law. 1 4 6 One possible means of alleviating the harshness of Spivey would be a revival of
this Speedy Trial Act, but with more realistic deadlines.
Another means of ensuring that cases are promptly disposed is by
a reconsideration of the meaning of the speedy trial right guaranteed
by Article I, § 18 of the North Carolina Constitution. Barker, though
clearly more protective of the public's interests in speedy trials than
Spivey, is not without its critics. One scholar has described the federal
Barker test as merely "the right of a few defendants, most egregiously
denied a speedy trial, to have the criminal charges dismissed against
them on that account."'147 "Quite obviously," another scholar contends, "criminal defendants as a class need some additional basis upon
which to compel the government to try them promptly.' 4 8 North Carolina should provide this additional basis in some constitutional form.
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that their interpretations of fundamental rights provide merely constitutional minimums; states are free to exceed those protections by more expansive
interpretations if their decisions are based on adequate and indepen143. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2000).
144. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 529-30.
145. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-701 (1982).
146. See Ronald M. Price, The North Carolina Speedy Trial Act, 17
REv. 173, 214-15 (1981).

WAKE FOREST L.

147. Wayne R. Lafave et al., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.3 (3d ed. 2000).

148. Id.
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dent state grounds.149 The North Carolina Supreme Court therefore is
free to interpret our state's speedy trial guarantee as providing additional protection to criminal defendants. Given the delicate balance on
the United States Supreme Court and the narrow majority voting to
sustain the flexible Barker framework in Doggett, the North Carolina
Supreme Court should attach a stronger meaning to our speedy trial
guarantee in Article I, § 18.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The problems encountered by the North Carolina Supreme Court
in Spivey demonstrate the pitfalls of the constitutional floor doctrine,
now a mainstay of "new federalism." First, when dealing with cases
involving fundamental constitutional rights, state courts must vigilantly research the appropriate topics to ensure their decisions comport with the existing federal constitutional law. An honest mistake,
like a misinterpretation of a Fifth Amendment speedy trial case as
Sixth Amendment speedy trial precedent, might convert an otherwise
uneventful decision into a constitutional quagmire. Second, the constitutional floor doctrine greatly encourages state courts to err on the
side of liberality. While a restrictive interpretation of a federal constitutional test will often encounter problems with the constitutional
floor doctrine, a liberal, rights-protective interpretation will virtually
always pass muster. Because of this fact, the Barker test, described as
"flexible," will only permit contortions one way. State courts thus will
generally stop short of the breaking point to ensure compliance with
the constitutional floor doctrine.
DarrenAllen

149. See William Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U.L. REv. 535, 548-50 (1986).
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